Debra Larsen v. Melinda Johnson : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Debra Larsen v. Melinda Johnson : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Andrea C. Alcabes; Hanson, Nelson, Chipman & Quigley; attorneys for appellee.
Terry M. Plant; Hanson, Epperson & Wallace, P.C.; attorneys for appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Debra Larsen v. Melinda Johnson, No. 960748 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/530




K F U 
50 
onoomg- ok 






Case No. 960748-CO 
Priority 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ON APPEAL FROM JURY VERDICT IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON, PRESIDING 
ANDREA C. ALCABES 
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & 
QUIGLEY 
136 S. Main Street, #910 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellee Johnson 
TERRY M. PLANT, #2610 
HANSON, EPPERSON & 
WALLACE, P.C. 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant Larsen 
Uv* i I 1997 
COURT OF APPEALS 






Case No. 960748-CO 
Priority 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ON APPEAL FROM JURY VERDICT IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON, PRESIDING 
ANDREA C. ALCABES 
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & 
QUIGLEY 
136 S. Main Street, #910 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 







4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
<~> Box 2970 P.O.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant Larsen 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. TIMELY OBJECTION WAS MADE TO 
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SETTLEMENT 
AMOUNT RECEIVED ARISING OUT OF 
MRS. LARSEN' S FIRST ACCIDENT 1 
II. EVIDENCE OF THE AMOUNT OF THE 
PRIOR SETTLEMENT WAS PREJUDICIAL 
AND IRRELEVANT IN THAT IT UNDULY 
INFLUENCED THE JURY TO MAKE A 
DECISION ON IMPROPER GROUNDS 2 
A. Evidence of the Amount of 
Settlement was Irrelevant 2 
B. The Introduction of the Amount 
of Settlement of the Prior 
Lawsuit was Prejudicial Because 
it Encouraged the Jury to Make 
its Decision Based on Improper 
Grounds 6 
1) Evidence of the Amount of 
the Prior Lawsuit was 
Inherently Prejudicial . 
2) The Jury was Improperly 
Influenced by the 
Erroneously Admitted 
Evidence of the Settlement 
Amount 
III. BECAUSE THE ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE 
OF THE SETTLEMENT AMOUNT PREJUDICIALLY 
AFFECTED MRS. LARSEN, THE TRIAL COURT'S 
ERROR WAS NOT HARMLESS 9 
CONCLUSION 16 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Beil v. Mayer, 
789 P.2d 1229 (Mont. 1990) 3, 
Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R., 
830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah App. 1992) 
Ferriola v. Burdick, 
153 A.2d 319 (Conn. 1959) 3 
Holt v. Holt. 
655 P.2d 677 (Utah 1982) 
Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-day Saints Hosp., 
318 P.2d 330, 333 (Utah 1957) 
Lownthal v. Mortimer, 
270 P.2d 942 (Cal. App. 1954) 
Nepple v. Weifenbach, 
274 N.W.2d 728, 734 (Iowa 1979) 3, 5, 6, 
Slusher v. Ospital, 
777 P.2d 445 (Utah 1989) 
Worthinqton v. Caldwell, 
396 P.2d 797 (Wash. 1965) 3, 
RULES CITED 




TIMELY OBJECTION WAS MADE TO THE INTRODUCTION 
OF THE SETTLEMENT AMOUNT RECEIVED ARISING OUT 
OF MRS. LARSEN' S FIRST ACCIDENT 
The Defendant, Melinda Johnson, apparently argues that the 
Plaintiff, Debra Larsen, never properly objected to the 
introduction of evidence of the amount of settlement received by 
the Plaintiff arising out of a prior accident. However, this 
argument is not supported by the record. On cross-examination, the 
Defendant' s attorney, Andrea C. Alcabes, questioned Mrs. Larsen 
regarding a settlement entered into by Mrs. Larsen arising out of 
the previous accident: 
A: Is it true that you settled your lawsuit from the 
first accident? 
A: That' s true. 
Q: Is it true that you received $172,000.00 in 
settlement of your claims in that lawsuit? 
Mr. Plant: 
Your honor, just for the record, I would lodge 
an objection for relevance. 
The Court: 
The objection is noted. It' s overruled. 
(R. 441). Because Mrs. Larsen's attorney lodged a proper and 
timely objection to the Defendant' s improper and irrelevant 
question regarding the amount of settlement, this Court can decide 
if a Defendant should be allowed to question a Plaintiff regarding 
the amount of a previous settlement in a different case involving 
different parties and different facts. 
1 
POINT II 
EVIDENCE OF THE AMOUNT OF THE PRIOR SETTLEMENT 
WAS PREJUDICIAL AND IRRELEVANT IN THAT IT 
UNDULY INFLUENCED THE JURY TO MAKE A DECISION 
ON IMPROPER GROUNDS 
The vast majority of courts in this country have refused to 
allow evidence of the amount of settlements of prior cases 
involving different accidents but injuries to the same area of the 
body. Courts reason that evidence of the amount of prior 
settlements is irrelevant and prejudicial. This reasoning is 
consistent with Utah Supreme Court decisions addressing similar 
issues. Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court' s 
decision to allow introduction of evidence of the amount of prior 
settlements and order a new trial on the merits. 
A. EVIDENCE OF THE AMOUNT OF SETTLEMENT WAS IRRELEVANT 
The Defendant argues that evidence regarding the amount paid 
in settlement for a prior lawsuit was properly admitted because it 
u
was relevant to whether the May, 1993 accident caused the injuries 
which Plaintiff complained of in this lawsuit." (Brief of Appellee 
at pg. 16.) Therefore, according to the Defendant, the trial court 
was within its discretion to allow the evidence to be presented to 
the jury. This position is without merit and unsupported by the 
vast majority of court decisions on this issue. In fact, Defendant 
cites only one 1962 Minnesota Supreme Court decision in support of 
her position that evidence of the amount of settlement of a 
previous lawsuit is admissible. (Brief of Appellee at pg. 19.) 
2 
On the other hand, many cases can be cited for the rule that 
evidence of the amount of prior settlements is inadmissable in a 
subsequent lawsuit. See: Beil v. Mayer, 789 P. 2d 1229 (Mont. 1990) 
(holding that admission of a previous settlement amount in a 
separate subsequent litigation was not harmless error even though 
jury found driver not negligent); Worthington v. Caldwell, 396 P.2d 
797 (Wash. 1965) (granting of new trial was not error where 
physician testified that plaintiff received $4,000.00 in settlement 
for previous injuries); Nepple v. Weifenbach, 274 N.W.2d 728, 734 
(Iowa 1979) (holding that "recoveries for prior injuries here were 
not proper areas of inquiry, and could not be made so by the court 
even in the exercise of its discretion." ) 
In a case strikingly similar to the case at bar, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court held that evidence of settlement amounts 
arising out of injuries to the same part of the body as injuries in 
a subsequent case could not be introduced at trial. In Ferriola v. 
Burdick, 153 A.2d 319 (Conn. 1959), the plaintiff had been 
seriously injured in a car accident in 1950. As a result of the 
accident, he under went an operation in 1952 and "a bone graft was 
performed and the spine was immobilized at that point." Id. at 
319. The plaintiff was out of work for three years and given an 
initial impairment rating of 50% which gradually improved to 25%. 
After the surgery, the plaintiff was able to return to work. Id. 
at 319-320. 
3 
In 1956, the plaintiff was involved in a second accident when 
the plaintiff s car was struck in the rear by the defendant's 
automobile. At trial the defendant conceded negligence, but 
claimed that his negligence was not the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries. The Connecticut Supreme Court described the 
second accident as follows, "the jolt to the car he was riding in, 
while not severe, caused immediate pain at the site of his original 
injury." Id. at 320. The plaintiff claimed that the second 
accident reaggravated the injury caused by the first accident. The 
defendant questioned the plaintiff, over objection, about the 
amount of settlement. The Supreme Court and remanded for a new 
trial. The Court stated: 
The trial court was in error in admitting evidence of the 
amount of the settlement of the first case over the 
plaintiff s objection. The file in that case had been 
admitted in evidence to show the claims made by the 
plaintiff therein. The question as to the amount of the 
settlement was admitted to test the credibility of the 
plaintiff. As he had already testified that the case had 
been settled, it is impossible to see how the amount of 
the settlement bore upon his credibility. The purpose of 
cross-examination is to ascertain the truth, and it 
provides a means for discrediting the testimony of a 
witness. . . .The question was completely irrelevant. 
The objection should have been sustained. 
Id. at 320. Likewise in this case, Mrs. Larsen testified at length 
regarding the prior accident in 1988 and the resulting injuries. 
(R. 362-375). Furthermore, Dr. Fogg, Mrs. Larsen's treating 
physician, testified at length regarding the first accident, the 
resulting injuries, and Mrs. Larsen's course of treatment. (R. 
480-492). Mrs. Larsen was cross-examined at length regarding the 
4 
first accident, her injuries, and her recovery. (R. 424-440). 
Given Mrs. Larsen's open discussion of the first accident, the 
amount she received in settlement was completely irrelevant, 
prejudicial, and served no useful purpose. 
The Defendant argues, in a conclusory fashion without strong 
analysis, that evidence of the settlement amount of the first 
lawsuit had a tendency to show that it was less probable that the 
second accident lit-up or aggravated Mrs. Larsen*s prior injury; 
therefore, the amount of settlement was relevant. This argument is 
without merit. The only thing that the settlement amount shows is 
that an insurance ad jus tor and the Plaintiff s attorney at the time 
felt that the first case was worth $170,000.00. As noted in Nepple 
v. Wiefenbach, 274 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 1979), what an attorney and an 
insurance adjustor think a "case" is worth gives very little 
indication of the extent of the original injury. "Cases" are 
valued on such factors as difficulty in taking a case to trial, 
close issues of liability, extremely reckless or negligent acts by 
the defendant, and subjective valuations by the parties. Id. at 
733. Furthermore, even the ability of the plaintiff's attorney 
will have an effect on the size of the settlement. Given these 
factors, the idea that a mere settlement in a previous case will 
somehow help the trier of fact in a subsequent case determine 
liability and/or damages is absurd. 
5 
Therefore, this Court should find that the Court committed 
reversible error by allowing the introduction of the amount of 
settlement of the previous lawsuit. 
B. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE AMOUNT OF SETTLEMENT OF THE 
PRIOR LAWSUIT WAS PREJUDICIAL BECAUSE IT ENCOURAGED 
THE JURY TO MAKE ITS DECISION BASED ON IMPROPER 
GROUNDS 
The Defendant apparently argues that introduction of the 
amount of settlement of the prior lawsuit was not prejudicial to 
Mrs. Larsen because there was substantial evidence challenging her 
assertion that her injuries were caused by the negligence of the 
Defendant. This argument is without merit because: 1) evidence of 
the amount of the prior lawsuit is by its very nature prejudicial; 
and, 2) the jury was improperly influenced by the evidence of the 
amount of settlement• 
1) Evidence Of The Amount Of The Prior Lawsuit 
Was Inherently Prejudicial 
Evidence of the amount of settlement of the prior lawsuit was 
inherently prejudicial because it suggested to the jury that Mrs. 
Larsen was receiving double recovery, was a litigious person, and 
was accident prone. As noted in the cases of Lownthal v. Mortimer, 
270 P.2d 942 (Cal. App. 1954) and Nepple v. Wiefenbach, 274 N.W.2d 
728 (Iowa 1979), evidence of the amount of settlement has a 
prejudicial effect because it focuses the minds of the jurors on 
improper considerations. 
In this case, the jurors were likely to believe that Mrs. 
Larsen had already been compensated for her injuries. In fact, 
6 
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of the evidence at trial showed that the 1993 car accident was the 
proximate cause of Mrs. Larsen's current injuries. Both Dr. Reed 
Fogg and Dr. Paul France testified that Mrs. Larsen's current 
injuries were caused when the Defendant rear-ended Mrs. Larsen1 s 
car. The Defendant called two expert witnesses, Dr. Tom Blotter 
and Dr. Nathaniel Nord. Neither Dr. Blotter nor Dr. Nord 
questioned Dr. Fogg or Dr. France' s conclusions regarding causation 
or offered alternative theories of causation. 
When asked what his opinion was regarding causation, Dr. Fogg 
testified as follows: 
There1 s no question in my mind that the accident, even 
though it really did not seem to be significant, she was 
in a big vehicle and she was wearing her seat belt, has 
somewhat stirred up the tissue to the degree where I have 
an impossible way of getting her back to the level of 
functioning that she was, say, back when I released her. 
(R. 509.). 
Dr. France testified regarding causation as well. His 
testimony is as follows: 
Q: In your opinion, Dr. France, is the condition that 
we've heard Debbie Larsen, herself, and Dr. Fogg 
describe, is that condition, was that, in fact, 
caused by the automobile accident of May 12th, 1993, 
in your opinion? 
A: My analysis of this case found causal mechanisms for 
disruption of the low back tissues that are 
consistent with the findings that she is currently 
demonstrating diagnostically. I have no other 
information that would demonstrate she received this 
by any other means, therefore, I causally associate 




the Defendant's expert, testified as follows: 
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it is "inconsistent with substantial justice." The Utah Appellate 
Courts have interpreted these requirements as follows; 
It is not always easy to tell when error should be 
regarded as prejudicial. . . .If the error appears to be 
of such a nature that it can be said with assurance that 
it was of no material consequence in its effect upon the 
trial because reasonable minds would have arrived at the 
same result, regardless of such error, it would be 
harmless and the granting of a new trial would not be 
warranted. On the other hand, if it appears to be of 
sufficient moment that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that in the absence of such error a different result 
would have eventuated, the error should be regarded as 
prejudicial and relief should be granted. Measured by 
such consideration we assay the possible effect of the 
error complained of, realizing of course that it is now 
quite impossible to tell definitely whether the verdict 
would have been different. 
Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande W.R. , 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah App. 
1992) (emphasis added); Quoting, Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-day 
Saints Hosp., 318 P.2d 330, 333 (Utah 1957); see also: Holt v. 
Holt, 655 P.2d 677 (Utah 1982) (where alimony award was vacated and 
remanded for redetermination because judge may have relied upon 
irrelevant testimony.) In this case it cannot be said with 
assurance that the erroneous admission of the settlement amount had 
no ueffect upon the trial because reasonable minds would have 
arrived at the same result." Berrett at 293. In fact, in this 
case, there is a "reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such 
error a different result would have eventuated." Berrett at 293. 
Here, if the evidence of the settlement amount were excluded, there 
is a reasonable likelihood that Mrs. Larsen would have prevailed 
because the jury would have found that the Defendant's acts 
proximately caused Mrs. Larsen' s damages. 
10 
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Brief of Appellee at Exhibit 2.) This does not mean that Dr. Fogg 
felt that Mrs. Larsen was "disabled." Dr. Fogg was questioned 
regarding this letter and he stated the following: 
A: This would be an impairment rating that was done in 
april of 1992. And it said, I believe, at this 
point her prognosis is good. She will probably have 
a partial permanent impairment rating of 
approximately 15 to 20 percent. 
I think it' s important to understand that in 1992 we 
were probably using the second or the third edition, 
that at that time impairment was rated on patients' 
diagnosis, the surgical procedure. And strange as 
it seems, the range of motion of her back. Since 
that time we have a further guideline we do not use 
that. 
Q: So you have a different scale now that you— 
A: We have a different scale. And this is what1 s so 
controversial. I think it' s also important to 
understand that we are talking impairment, we are 
not talking disability. And in the state of Utah we 
do not give a disability rating, but we only give an 
impairment rating as a physician. An impairment 
rating is then transferred to a disability rating, 
either by an administrative person or a law person. 
(R. 529-530.) Therefore, Mrs. Larsen was not "disabled" in April 
of 1993. Rather, she had a somewhat limited range of motion in her 
back due to the surgery preformed to correct the problems from the 
1988 accident. 
Mrs. Larsen testified at length regarding the accident which 
gave rise to this lawsuit. On May 12, 1993, Mrs. Larsen was 
stopped at a stop light near her home. (R. 376, 380.) Mrs. Larsen 
had her seat belt on and her foot on the brake. (R. 387, 550.) 
Mrs. Larsen noticed that Mandie, her four year old daughter, had 
gotten out of her car seat and was standing on the rear passenger 
12 
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injections in her spine. (R. 402.) Mrs. Larsen has undergone 
surgery, injections, and massage therapy all without success. (R. 
403.) Within eleven or twelve months of the accident, Mrs. Larsen 
began developing numbness down her left side to her foot. (R. 
404.) Today, Mrs. Larsen can no longer care for her family, 
experiences constant pain, is forced to stay in bed most of the 
time, and can no longer take part in social events or travel. 
(R. 405, 406, 408, 412-415.) Since the May 1993 accident, Mrs. 
Larsen's condition has progressively deteriorated to the point that 
she had no hope of ever improving. (R. 418-419.) 
The Defendant attempts to make much of the fact that Mrs. 
Larsen did not mention that she attempted to catch Mandie during 
her deposition testimony. However, in the deposition the question 
asked was Mtell me what happened to your body when you felt that 
jolt from behind." Mrs. Larsen answered truthfully, uI went back 
and slightly forward." (R. 448.) No question was asked regarding 
Mandie, the specific question was, "what happened to your body." 
Mrs. Larsen appropriately limited her response to the question 
asked. Furthermore, Mrs. Larsen told Dr. Fogg when describing the 
incident to him in 1993 about turning to catch Mandie as she fell. 
(R. 400.) 
The Defendant also alleges that the force of the impact would 
have caused Mandie to fall backward and not forward. (Brief of 
Appellee at pg. 28.) The forces which caused Mandie to fall 
forward were explained by Dr. France: 
14 
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CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff, Debra Larsen, urges this Court to overturn the 
trial court and remand this case for a new trial because the trial 
court erroneously admitted evidence of the amount of settlement of 
a previous lawsuit which prejudicially affected the Plaintiff s 
case. 
DATED this 21~^ day of November, 1997. 
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